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Over the period 1995-1998 South Africa embarked upon an unprecedented legislative programme. In 1998 alone, more than 120 laws were passed by the new democratic parliament. In the arena of criminal procedure and criminal law these laws were not in the direction of the reforms suggested by South Africa's Constitution and Bill of Rights, enacted in 1996; instead, they were intended to convey a 'tough on crime' approach. In a short space of time a number of protections for accused persons, many of which had been developed by the courts during apartheid to ameliorate the effects of unjust security detention laws, were simply swept away by legislative fiat, encompassed in amendments to the Criminal Procedure Act (CPA) . 1 This article seeks to describe and analyse the 'tough on crime' policy approach, and to assess its impact.
The 'tough on crime' policy approach
During the apartheid years it was accepted that a bail application was a matter of urgency: after all, a person's freedom was at stake. 2 But in 1997 the CPA was amended so that it explicitly provides in s50(6)(b)
that an arrested person is not entitled to be brought to court after hours. 3 Bringing bail applications after hours was a common practice in magistrate's courts before 1998, and prior to 1994 the courts on a number of occasions confirmed the right of an accused to bring a bail application within the 48 hours envisaged by the then section 50; some went so far as to say there was a duty on the part of the state to co-operate and make it possible for a bail application to take place. 4 Commentators at the time voiced their dissatisfaction at the change, noting:
'The irony inherent in this reactionary measure is, of course, striking: a procedural human right deemed under the old order through creative and enlightened judicial interpretation has been summarily taken away by decree of the new order.'
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Protective limits on the length of time for which bail applications may be postponed for further investigation were undone in 1995. 6 Section 50(7), which contained a time limit of a day on delaying bail applications for the purpose of further investigations, was deleted and replaced, 7 and subsequently tweaked by the Amendment Act 62 of 2000, which * Jean Redpath is a researcher at the Community Law Centre of the University of the Western Cape. She specialises in the analysis of data informing criminal justice system law reform in African countries.
The 'tough on crime' approach embodied in bail and sentencing law has had a profound impact on the trends around remand detention, including prison overcrowding of such an extent that it is estimated to have contributed to an additional 8 500 natural deaths in custody. Ultimately the policies have led, in practice, to an
'Alice in Wonderland' effect: fewer people are being tried and sentenced, while more than ever are denied their freedom without ever being tried in a court of law.
provides for the postponement of a bail application for seven days at a time if the court, inter alia, thinks it has insufficient information to make a decision on bail, if the accused is going to be charged with a serious offence, or the court simply thinks it is in the interests of justice to do so. 8 In addition to these procedural changes relating to when bail applications may be heard, a greater onus has been placed on the accused. The court hearing the bail application must be satisfied that the interests of justice are served by release, whereas previously the court had to be satisfied that the interests of justice are served by continued detention. 9 In relation to accused persons charged with serious offences listed in Schedule 6, 10 such as premeditated murder and gang rape, bail has all but been ruled out. Section 60(11) places the onus on an accused charged with such an offence to adduce evidence to satisfy the court that exceptional circumstances exist, which, in the interests of justice, permit release.
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This is called a 'reverse onus' and implies that if an accused charged with a Schedule 6 offence at the bail application provides no evidence, or provides unexceptional evidence in support of the contention that the interests of justice will be served by his release, he will not be released on bail.
In relation to Schedule 5 12 offences, which are serious offences such as murder and rape that have not been aggravated by additional factors (such as premeditation in the case of murder), the amendments require that 'the accused be detained in custody until he or she is dealt with in accordance with the law, unless the accused, having been given a reasonable opportunity to do so, adduces evidence which satisfies the court that the interests of justice permit his or her release'. This formulation is slightly less onerous than that applicable to Schedule 6 offences.
The Constitutional Court found that the limitation inherent in s60(11) (exceptional circumstances for Schedule 6 offences) on section 35(1)(f) of the Constitution, which provides that 'everyone who is arrested for allegedly committing an offence has the right to be released from detention if the interests of justice permit, subject to reasonable conditions', was reasonable and justifiable in our current circumstances of widespread violent crime. 13 The Court noted that 'the subsection does not say they must be circumstances above and beyond, At the time of the introduction of minimum sentences, only the high courts, which generally hear fewer than 1% of criminal cases, had the sentencing jurisdiction to impose many of these sentences. Consequently, soon after the minimum sentencing provisions came into effect, the sentencing jurisdiction of the regional courts was extended to 15 years' (from 10 years') imprisonment, and the district courts' jurisdiction was extended to three years' (from 12 months') imprisonment.
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A messy period of almost a decade (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) followed, during which regional courts were empowered to hear life imprisonment matters, but had to refer them to the high courts for sentencing.
Incidentally, a parliamentary study found that in one in ten such cases the high court ended up acquitting the accused, who had been found guilty in the regional court. 33 Ultimately the regional courts were empowered in December 2007 to hand down sentences of life imprisonment in these matters.
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The automatic right of appeal that went with these sentences was legislatively removed -possibly unintentionally -in April 2010. The impact of 'tough on crime' policy changes
The practical impact of the changed bail and sentencing framework was borne most obviously by the Department of Correctional Services (DCS). In only five years the pre-trial population in prisons had tripled. Natural deaths per 100 000 inmates
Since that peak, the pre-trial population has hovered around the 50 000 mark, with some seasonal dips to the 40 000 mark. to 688 937. 51 Consequently the drop in remand admissions cannot be attributed to a drop in arrests. What has reduced is the extent to which such arrests translate into remand admission into prisons. In 2002/3 the remand admissions figure was 70% of the priority crime arrests figure (in the previous year there were more remand admissions than priority crime arrests). By 2008/9 the ratio of remand arrests had dropped to 53%; in 2010/11 it was only 33%.
How can this be explained, given that the legislative framework in relation to bail remains strict? Is the remand trend justified by court outcomes?
In short then, the data show that fewer people are verdict after'. 62 What is clear is that the number of people held on remand in prisons is decreasing, the time for which they are held on remand in prisons is increasing, and the likelihood that they will ever be sentenced to a term of imprisonment is decreasing.
Conclusion
The 'tough on crime' policy approach embodied in the tightening of bail laws and lengthy minimum sentences has had, over the long term, an unanticipated impact. After an initial period in which the DCS bore the brunt of predicted and massive increases in the total prison population, there was a subsequent stabilisation.
Prior to stabilisation, the twin unsustainable bail and sentencing policies led to conditions of detention resulting in more deaths from natural causes due to overcrowding in just over a decade, than the number of death penalty deaths during the apartheid era. 63 As a result the criminal justice system developed methods to ameliorate the impact of these unsustainable policies. Some prisons refused to accept any more remand detainees, and detainees were then held at police stations. The full extent to which this occurred and continues to occur, is unclear.
The criminal justice trends suggest that, in addition, the system has generally slowed down and cut back on the number of people it chooses to prosecute, 64 the number it convicts, and the speed with which it does so, leading to a reduction in the number of people sentenced year-on-year.
The sentenced prison population is increasingly composed of those with longer sentences, but most will be released on parole at the earliest possible parole date. 7 Section 50(7) (now deleted): 'If a person is arrested on suspicion of having committed an offence but a charge has not been brought against him or her because further investigation is needed to determine whether a charge may be brought against him or her, the investigation in question shall be completed as soon as it is reasonably possible and the person in question shall as soon as it is reasonably possible thereafter, and in any event not later than the day after his or her arrest contemplated in subsections (1) and (2), be brought before an ordinary court of law to be charged and enabled to institute bail proceedings in accordance with subsection (6) or be informed of the reason for his or her further detention, failing which he or she shall be released.'
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The full text of Section 50(6)(d): 'The lower court before which a person is brought in terms of this subsection, may postpone any bail proceedings or bail application to any date or court, for a period not exceeding seven days at a time, on the terms which the court may deem proper and which are not inconsistent with any provision of this Act, if-(i) the court is of the opinion that it has insufficient information or evidence at its disposal to reach a decision on the bail application; (ii) the prosecutor informs the court that the matter has been or is going to be referred to an attorneygeneral for the issuing of a written confirmation referred to in section 60 (11A); (iii) the prosecutor informs the court that the person is going to be charged with an offence referred to in Schedule 6 and that the bail application is to be heard by a regional court: (iv) it appears to the court that it is necessary to provide the State with a reasonable opportunity to (aa) procure material evidence that may be lost if bail is granted; or (bb) perform the functions referred to in section 37; or (v) it appears to the court that it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so.' 9 Prior to amendment, Section 60(1) (a) read as follows: 'An accused who is in custody in respect of an offence shall, subject to the provisions of section 50 (6) and (7), be entitled to be released on bail at any stage preceding his or her conviction in respect of such offence, unless the court finds that it is in the interests of justice that he or she be detained in custody. After amendment, section 60(1) (a) reads: An accused who is in custody in respect of an offence shall, subject to the provisions of section 50 (6), be entitled to be released on bail at any stage preceding his or her conviction in respect of such offence, if the court is satisfied that the interests of justice so permit.' [Own emphasis]
10 The offences listed in Schedule 6 are: 'Murder, when-(a) it was planned or premeditated; (b) the victim was-(i) a law enforcement officer performing his or her functions as such, whether on duty or not, or a law enforcement officer who was killed by virtue of his or her holding such a position; or (ii) a person who has given or was likely to give material evidence with reference to any offence referred to in Schedule 1; (c) the death of the victim was caused by the accused in committing or attempting to commit or after having committed or having attempted to commit one of the following offences: (i) Rape; or (ii) robbery with aggravating circumstances; or (d) the offence was committed by a person, group of persons or syndicate acting in the execution or furtherance of a common purpose or conspiracy. Rape-(a) when committed-(i) in circumstances where the victim was raped more than once, whether by the accused or by any co-perpetrator or accomplice; (ii) by more than one person, where such persons acted in the execution or furtherance of a common purpose or conspiracy; (iii) by a person who is charged with having committed two or more offences of rape; an automatic or semi-automatic firearm, explosives or armament. Any offence in contravention of Section 36 of the Arms and Ammunition Act 1969 (Act 75 of 1969), on account of being in possession of more than 1 000 rounds of ammunition intended for firing in an arm contemplated in Section 39 (2) (a) (i) of that Act. Any offence relating to exchange control, extortion, fraud, forgery, uttering, theft, or any offence referred to in Part 1 to 4, or Section 17, 20 or 21 (in so far as it relates to the aforementioned offences) of Chapter 2 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 2004-(a) involving amounts of more than R500 000,00; or (b) involving amounts of more than R100 000,00, if it is alleged that the offence was committed by a person, group of persons, syndicate or any enterprise acting in the execution or furtherance of a common purpose or conspiracy; or (c) if it is alleged that the offence was committed by any law enforcement officer-(i) involving amounts of more than R10 000,00; or (ii) as a member of a group of persons, syndicate or any enterprise acting in the execution or furtherance of a common purpose or conspiracy. Indecent assault on a child under the age of 16 years. An offence referred to in Schedule 1-(a) and the accused has previously been convicted of an offence referred to in Schedule 1; or (b) which was allegedly committed whilst he or she was released on bail in respect of an offence referred to in Schedule 1. 44 Parole is a manner of placement whereby an offender, subject to completion of a minimum period of sentence inside the correctional centre, and subject to certain criteria being met, may be allowed to serve a part of his/ her sentence in the community. A person placed out on parole will be placed under strict conditions and under the supervision of a parole/ probation officer and will remain under supervision in the community until the sentence is completed in full. If he/she transgresses any of these conditions, he/she may be arrested and returned to a correctional centre to serve the remainder of the sentence.
45 For most sentenced offenders (those serving between two years and life imprisonment), the earliest parole date occurs when half the sentence has been served, in terms of Section 73(6)(a) of the Correctional Services Act 1998 (Act 111 of 1998). For a life sentence, 25 years must be served, and sentences in terms of minimum sentencing require four-fifths. 49 Section 49G of the Correctional Services Act and 63A of the Criminal Procedure Act are relevant. Section 63A does grant the head of a correctional centre, under certain circumstances and with regard to certain crimes, the discretion to either seek the release of a remand detainee or to request amendment of the conditions of such a person's bail. The head of the correctional centre may approach the relevant court if he/she is satisfied that the population is reaching such proportions that it constitutes a material and imminent threat to the human dignity, physical health or safety of an accused where an accused has been granted bail but remains in custody. The extent to which the provision has been used in practice is unclear. It only applies to detainees who have been granted bail but remain in custody (presumably because bail cannot be paid). Section 49G of the Correctional Services Act provides that that a remand detainee may not be detained for a period exceeding two years without such matter having been brought to the attention of the court concerned. In April 2014, DCS announced that 380 detainees 'were no longer in remand detention' as a result of this provision being put to use. 
